The Conflicted Advice Problem: A Response to Conflicts & Capital Allocation by Fletcher, Gina-Gail S.
The Conflicted Advice Problem: 
A Response to Conflicts & Capital Allocation 
GINA-GAIL S. FLETCHER* 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 1 
II. THE LAW GOVERNING INVESTMENT ADVICE ................................... 4 
A. Brokers & Suitability ................................................................ 5 
B. Investment Advisers & Fiduciary Duties .................................. 6 
C. Blurred Lines ............................................................................ 7 
III. EFFORTS TO “FIDUCIARIZE” INVESTMENT ADVICE .......................... 8 
A. The DOL and the Fiduciary Rule ............................................. 9 
B. The SEC & Regulation Best Interest ....................................... 13 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR RETAIL INVESTORS .......................................... 17 
A. Conflicted Advice .................................................................... 17 
B. Investor Confusion .................................................................. 20 
C. Investor Protection ................................................................. 22 
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 24 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Benjamin Edwards’ Conflicts & Capital Allocation is a timely 
piece that examines the far-reaching consequences of commission-based 
compensation for financial advisors.1 In the article, Professor Edwards 
convincingly demonstrates that commission-based compensation creates 
structural conflicts of interest for financial advisors who sell their clients 
financial products that generate higher commissions for the advisor but do not 
maximize the client’s wealth.2 But, as Professor Edwards argues, the effect of 
financial advisors’ compensation-related conflicts extends beyond retail 
investment clients and into the financial markets, causing systemic capital 
misallocation. The potential macro-level harm that arises from conflicted 
investment advice thus requires an effective response. To this end, Professor 
Edwards puts forward a straightforward, bright-line proposal: a prohibition on 
commission-based compensation for financial advisors.3 As Professor 
Edwards asserts: “[b]anning commission compensation for personalized 
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 1 Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181 (2017). 
In this Response, the term “financial advisor” refers to investment advisers and broker-
dealers, collectively. The difference between the two is delineated in greater detail infra. 
 2 See id. at 184 (“Some products offer the advisors larger commissions, and advisors 
have an incentive to steer clients toward products that maximize advisor commissions.”). 
 3 See id. at 185, 209. 
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financial advice will better align financial advisor incentives with their clients’ 
interest and improve capital allocation.”4 He further opines that a complete 
prohibition on commissions is the most efficient way to minimize and avoid 
the harms that accompany a commission-based compensation structure.5 
Compensation-related conflicts of interest are common in the financial 
markets beyond financial advisors and retail investors.6 Credit rating agencies, 
for example, are paid by the issuers whose debt they are rating, which may 
incentivize them to inflate ratings in order to attract more ratings 
opportunities.7 Similarly, directors set their own compensation for serving on a 
corporation’s board, which allows them to potentially maximize their earnings 
at the expense of the corporation and its shareholders.8 Indeed, one need look 
no further than the ongoing scandal that currently embroils Wells Fargo 
regarding fraudulent accounts that the bank’s employees created in order to 
meet their quotas.9 In each example, the compensation structure is innately 
conflicted, has been viewed as a primary impetus for related scandals, and has 
resulted in many of the ills identified in Conflicts and Capital Allocation.10 
                                                                                                                     
 4 Id. at 209. 
 5 See id. at 209, 212. 
 6 See Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies 
in the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 246–49 (2009) 
(describing the conflict of interest inherent in the credit agencies). See generally Susan 
E.K. Christoffersen et al., What Do Consumers’ Fund Flows Maximize? Evidence from 
Their Brokers’ Incentives, 68 J. FIN. 201 (2013) (demonstrating that brokers’ compensation 
increases when brokers are affiliated with family funds and consequently involved in 
investment recommendations). 
 7 See Lynch, supra note 6, at 247 (“[U]nder the issuer-pays revenue model, the 
interests of issuers and the interests of the credit rating agencies necessarily coalesce, and 
the credit rating agencies can make more money by providing their paying customers—
issuers—with higher ratings.”). 
 8 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in 
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 763 (2002) (“The second 
agency problem in most public companies is that executives might make decisions that 
maximize their own utility but that fail to maximize shareholder value.”). 
 9 See Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening 
Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-years-of-
harm-to-customers.html [https://perma.cc/K5TE-65CC] (“Regulators said the bank’s 
employees had been motivated to open the unauthorized accounts by compensation policies 
that rewarded them for opening new accounts . . . .”). 
 10 See Robert J. Rhee, On Duopoly and Compensation Games in the Credit Rating 
Industry, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 85, 86–87, 89, 94 (2013) (stating that the issuer-pay 
compensation model led credit rating agencies to play a significant role in the 2008 
financial crisis); Allana M. Grinshteyn, Horseshoes and Hand Grenades: The Dodd-Frank 
Act’s (Almost) Attack on Credit Rating Agencies, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 937, 978 (2011) 
(“[T]he Financial Crisis Inquiry Commissio[n] . . . conclu[ded] that the credit rating 
agencies were among the main actors to blame for the economic crisis . . . .”); Janice Kay 
McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign 
Management and Shareholders’ Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 
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However, despite the innate and unavoidable issues that accompany 
commission-based compensation, the structure seems to be here with us to 
stay, at least in the short- to medium-term.11 Thus, in this Response, I consider 
recent efforts to implement one of the alternatives to commission-based 
compensation that Professor Edwards raises—namely, the imposition of 
fiduciary duties or a fiduciary-like standard on financial advisors. 
Fiduciary obligations developed as part of the law of equity, specifically in 
instances in which a person was expected to act as a “trustee” because of her 
relationship of trust and confidence with another.12 A fiduciary is one who is 
granted authority to manage the affairs of the principal and, therefore, is 
entrusted to further the principal’s best interest in her actions and decisions.13 
Thus, integral to fiduciary obligations is the expectation that the fiduciary act: 
(i) loyally by eschewing or disclosing conflicts of interest; (ii) with care by 
acting deliberatively in decision-making; and (iii) with candor by disclosing all 
material and relevant information to the principal.14 Recently, there has been 
legislative and regulatory interest in harmonizing the standards of conduct 
applicable to all financial advisors, bringing them closer to a fiduciary(-like) 
standard.15 The first salvo in the battle to impose fiduciary obligations on 
                                                                                                                     
39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 974–75 (2004) (describing the compensation structure 
adopted by Enron’s board of directors, which led to Enron’s bankruptcy); John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Shareholder Activism in the Era of Trump: What Strategy Works?, CLS BLUE SKY 
BLOG (Nov. 21, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/11/21/shareholder-
activism-in-the-era-of-trump-what-strategy-works/ [https://perma.cc/9P76-9454] (“A final 
example this year of incentive compensation producing ethically dubious risk-taking and 
fraudulent behavior is supplied by Wells Fargo & Co. . . . Under pressure, lower echelon 
employees opted to cheat to avoid losing their jobs.”). 
 11 See Coffee, supra note 10 (“Clearly, incentive compensation is here to stay . . . .”). 
 12 See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 880–81 (1988) (describing the historical development of fiduciary 
law and obligations). 
 13 See id. at 882. 
 14 See id. at 882, 899, 906; see also James S. Wrona, The Best of Both Worlds: A 
Fact-Based Analysis of the Legal Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers 
and a Framework for Enhanced Investor Protection, 68 BUS. LAW. 1, 11–13 (2012). 
 15 See 15 U.S.C.     § 80b-11(g)(1) (2012) (authorizing the Securities Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) to promulgate rules providing that the standard of conduct for all 
brokers, dealers, and investment advisers be to “act in the best interest of the customer 
without regard to the financial or other interest of the broker, dealer, or investment adviser 
providing the advice”); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,     § 913(g)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828–29 (2010) (establishing the 
standards of conduct for investment advisers); Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict 
of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550). The imposition of a fiduciary standard would 
change the regulatory landscape for broker-dealers, who currently operate under a 
suitability standard. Registered financial advisors, on the other hand, are already subject to 
a fiduciary standard. See General Information on the Regulation of Investment Advisers, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 11, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iaregulation/memoia.htm 
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financial advisors came from the Department of Labor (“DOL”), which 
implemented the “Fiduciary Rule” pursuant to its authority under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).16 And, after the 
Fiduciary Rule failed to come to fruition,17 the Securities Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) proposed Regulation Best Interest to impose a best 
interest standard on broker-dealers.18 Both are efforts aimed at reducing the 
problem of conflicted advice, enhancing investor protection, and minimizing 
investor confusion. Yet, as this Response demonstrates, the problem of 
conflicted investment advice is intractable and persists despite these regulatory 
proposals.  
This Response focuses on these recent efforts to “fiduciarize” or otherwise 
heighten the standard of conduct applicable to financial advisors and analyzes 
whether and to what extent the proposed fiduciary(-like) standards minimize 
the conflicted advice problem. As regulators and industry actors attempt to 
tackle the innate conflicts of interest that arise in the investor-financial advisor 
relationship through the imposition of fiduciary(-like) duties, it is necessary to 
analyze the potential implications of these proposals.  
This brief Response first analyzes the applicable legal framework that 
governs the conduct of financial advisors in providing investment advice to 
retail customers. The Response highlights the muddled and uneven state of 
affairs with respect to different types of financial advisors to demonstrate the 
confusion that retail investors face. Next, it discusses the short-lived and now-
defunct DOL Fiduciary Rule and the SEC’s recently proposed rule, Regulation 
Best Interest. Before concluding, this Response analyzes the implications, both 
positive and negative, of these proposals for retail investors. 
II. THE LAW GOVERNING INVESTMENT ADVICE 
Retail investors may rely on brokers and/or investment advisers19 to help 
them decide how to allocate their investments.20 To the typical retail investor, 
                                                                                                                     
[https://perma.cc/QCN8-SDBW] (“[I]nvestment advisers owe their clients a duty to 
provide only suitable investment advice.”). 
 16 See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20,946 (“With this regulatory action, the Department will replace 
the 1975 regulations with a definition of fiduciary investment advice that better reflects the 
broad scope of the statutory text and its purposes and better 
protects . . . beneficiaries . . . from conflicts of interest, imprudence, and disloyalty.”). 
 17 See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
 18 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,675 (May 9, 2018) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (new rule establishing standard of conduct for broker-
dealers). 
 19 Investment advisers is also spelled “advisors.” This Response opts for the former 
spelling when referring to investment advisers (i.e., those covered under the Investment 
Adviser Act of 1940). However, when referring collectively to financial services 
professionals who work with and provide advice to retail investors, this Response uses 
“advisors”—e.g., “financial advisors” and “retirement investment advisors.” 
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there is little-to-no difference between a broker and an investment adviser.21 
Yet, the law makes a stark distinction between the two, particularly with 
respect to investor protection.22 Key to understanding why the law treats the 
two seemingly similar positions so differently lies in understanding how 
brokers and investment advisers have historically interacted with retail 
customers. Traditionally, brokers have been considered salespeople and, 
consequently, they are required only to sell “suitable” financial products to 
their clients. Investment advisers, on the other hand, provide holistic 
investment advice to clients and, as a result, investment advisers are 
considered fiduciaries of their clients. The legal distinction between brokers 
and investment advisers is considered in greater detail below.  
A. Brokers & Suitability 
A simple, yet incomplete, description of brokers is that they are 
salespeople.23 A broker is an intermediary between (i) financial firms that 
create financial products and (ii) retail investors who may want to invest in 
these products.24 Brokers are regulated under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (“the 34 Act”), which subjects them to SEC oversight (indirectly)25 and 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) regulatory 
requirements (directly).26 FINRA regulates brokers’ compensation, training, 
qualification and, importantly, their responsibilities to and interactions with 
retail investors.27 Per FINRA Rule 2010, brokers “in the conduct of [their] 
                                                                                                                     
 20 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-
DEALERS i (Jan. 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z5DJ-Q3RN] (“Retail investors seek guidance from broker-dealers and 
investment advisers to manage their investments and to meet their . . . financial goals.”). 
 21 See ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND CORP., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY 
PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS xiii (2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/K74P-
QFDJ] (finding that retail investors do not differentiate well between advisory accounts 
and brokerage accounts and have similar expectations for both). 
 22 See id. at 14–15, 115. 
 23 See Anita K. Krug, The Other Securities Regulator: A Case Study in Regulatory 
Damage, 92 TUL. L. REV. 339, 357 (2017) (“[A] broker’s purpose is not to provide 
investment advice but, rather, to sell securities. Simply put, brokers are salespersons.”). 
 24 See HUNG ET AL., supra note 21, at xiii, 19. 
 25 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS BY THE 
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 5 (Mar. 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9LPN-EYSY]. 
 26 FINRA is a self-regulatory organization (SRO) charged with overseeing the 
financial markets and enforcing rules that govern the conduct of financial market 
participants. FINRA is a not-for-profit organization that is not a government agency, but is 
subject to the regulatory authority of the SEC. See About FINRA, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY 
AUTH., http://www.finra.org/about [https://perma.cc/E95N-2V46]. 
 27 See id. 
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business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor.”28 FINRA’s 
standards of conduct require that brokers ascertain the “suitability” of a 
security before it is sold to a retail investor.29 Per the suitability standard, 
brokers must “know their customer” and “know the security” (i.e., that the 
broker have a reasonable basis on which to believe that the security is 
appropriate for the customer at the time of sale).30 Thus, brokers are prohibited 
from selling or promoting securities that are contrary to the investors’ 
preferences.31 The suitability standard is intended to address the inherent 
conflicts of interest that brokers face as intermediaries between the markets 
and retail investors and also recognize the sales focus of brokers in their client 
interactions.32 
B. Investment Advisers & Fiduciary Duties 
Traditionally, to the extent brokers provide investment advice to 
customers, such advice is secondary to the brokers’ sales focus.33 On the other 
hand, the primary responsibility of investment advisers is to provide 
investment advice to clients.34 Investment advisers are not intermediaries 
between the markets and investors; rather, they provide financial advice to 
clients and are prohibited from entering into securities transactions with 
                                                                                                                     
 28 FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA MANUAL Rule 2010 (2008), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=5504 
[https://perma.cc/AK62-633C]. 
 29 See Gary A. Varnavides, The Flawed State of Broker-Dealer Regulation and the 
Case for an Authentic Federal Fiduciary Standard for Broker-Dealers, 16 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 210 (2011) (explaining the difference between the standard imposed 
on brokers under FINRA and the fiduciary obligations). 
 30 See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 11-02: KNOW YOUR 
CUSTOMER AND SUITABILITY 2 (Oct. 7, 2011), 
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p122778.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L98T-CKEE]. 
 31 See Wrona, supra note 14, at 11, 20 (discussing FINRA’s suitability rule which 
obliges brokers to recommend strategies and transactions to their clients based on their 
needs and investment profiles). 
 32 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT 
FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 121 (Mar. 2008), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5M4N-XRSZ] [hereinafter TREASURY BLUEPRINT]. 
 33 See Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers — What’s in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 31–32 (2005) (explaining the asset-based fee structure which best 
promotes “customers’ and the brokers’ interests”); see also Certain Broker-Dealers 
Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424, 20,428 (Apr. 19, 2005) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). 
 34 The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 defines an investment adviser as “any person 
who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . . as to the value of 
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities.” 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940     § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C.     § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012). 
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clients.35 The Supreme Court has described their role as “furnishing to clients 
on a personal basis competent, unbiased, and continuous advice regarding the 
sound management of their investments.”36 Investment advisers are regulated 
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) and are 
subject to direct SEC oversight.37 The Advisers Act imposes disclosure and 
recordkeeping requirements, governs advertising by investment advisers, and 
restricts the payment of referral fees, among other items.38 Importantly, 
investment advisers are fiduciaries of their clients, which requires them to act 
in their clients’ best interests at all times and to avoid conflicts with the 
clients’ interests.39 Lastly, in making recommendations, it is not enough for an 
investment adviser to determine whether the investment is suitable for her 
client.40 Rather, she is required to consider her client’s financial resources, 
investment objectives, risk appetite, and investment experience in giving 
investment advice.41 
C. Blurred Lines 
The sharp legal delineation between brokers and investment advisers 
notwithstanding, developments in the financial markets and financial services 
have resulted in a considerable blurring of the line between brokers and 
advisers. For example, the advent of electronic trading markets has automated 
trade execution, thereby reducing brokers’ trading responsibilities.42 To 
                                                                                                                     
 35 See id.     § 206(3). 
 36 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 187 
(1963) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 76-477, at 1 (1939)). 
 37 See 15 U.S.C.     § 80b-3; see also 17 C.F.R.     § 275. 
 38 See Wrona, supra note 14, at 14–16 (describing the different obligations and 
restrictions imposed on investment advisers under the Advisers Act). 
 39 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1977) (stating that 
Congress intended section 206 of the Advisers Act, the antifraud provision, to establish 
“federal fiduciary standards” for advisers); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 
106, 146 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Section 206 imposes a fiduciary duty on investment advisers to 
act at all times in the best interest of the fund and its investors . . . .”), reh’g granted & 
opinion withdrawn, 573 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Lay, 568 F. Supp. 2d 791, 
812 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (an adviser must “act in good faith and in the best interests of its 
client”). 
 40 See Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers 
Should Be Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 725 (2012). 
 41 See Steven D. Irwin et al., Wasn’t My Broker Always Looking Out for My Best 
Interests? The Road to Become a Fiduciary, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 41, 50 (2009) (“[A] 
fiduciary duty sets a higher standard than the ‘suitability rule.’ The centerpiece of the 
fiduciary duty is the requirement that investment advisers act in the best interest of their 
clients.”) 
 42 See Michael Davis et al., Ethics, Finance, and Automation: A Preliminary Survey 
of Problems in High Frequency Trading, 19 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 851, 854 (2013) 
(explaining that even though intermediaries, such as brokers and investment advisers, still 
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maintain their value within the market, brokers began focusing on providing 
investment advice to clients.43 Brokers, therefore, increasingly resemble 
investment advisers in their operations, but are able to avoid the more onerous 
fiduciary obligation standard.44 The current state of affairs is concerning 
primarily because of its impact on investor protection. Not only are retail 
investors unable to distinguish between brokers and investment advisers, but 
many retail investors expect that their financial advisor (regardless of title) is 
required to act in their best interest (i.e., as a fiduciary).45 
Against this backdrop, the U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) in 
200846 and 200947 recommended harmonization of the standard of conduct 
imposed on brokers and investment advisers to minimize investor confusion. 
As Treasury noted in its 2009 Report, financial services professionals that 
provide investment advice to retail investors, logically, ought to be held to the 
same or highly similar standards to minimize regulatory arbitrage and investor 
confusion.48 Nonetheless, the legal and regulatory gap between brokers and 
investment advisers persisted, until the DOL proposed the Fiduciary Rule in 
2016. 49 The Fiduciary Rule attempted to erase the blurred lines between 
brokers and investment advisers, treating all financial services professionals 
who provided investment advice as fiduciaries under ERISA.50 Importantly, 
the proposed Fiduciary Rule marked the beginning of serious regulatory 
efforts to harmonize the legal framework applicable to brokers and investment 
advisers.  
III. EFFORTS TO “FIDUCIARIZE” INVESTMENT ADVICE 
Prior to the DOL’s proposal of the Fiduciary Rule, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) 
                                                                                                                     
participate in transactions involving automation, they do not automatically take 
responsibility for the consequences from these transactions). 
 43 See generally Laby, supra note 40 (discussing the increase in brokers advertising 
their advice services starting in the 1990s). 
 44 See id. at 744. 
 45 See id. at 733–34. 
 46 See TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 32, at 125–26.  
 47 Interpretive Rule Under the Advisers Act Affecting Broker-Dealers, 72 Fed. Reg. 
55,126 (Sept. 28, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 71–72 (2009), 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N2NB-AVW9] [hereinafter FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM]. 
 48 See FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 47, at 71. 
 49 JOHN J. TOPOLESKI & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44884, 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S 2016 FIDUCIARY RULE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 1 (July 2017). 
 50 See Definition of Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 
2550). 
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granted the SEC authority to harmonize the standard of care applicable to 
brokers and investment advisers to the extent they provided personalized retail 
investment advice.51 To the confusion of many, the SEC failed to exercise its 
authority, choosing instead to allow the problematic gap in the legal treatment 
of brokers and investment advisers to persist.52 However, once the DOL 
proposed the Fiduciary Rule, it forced the SEC to consider how it would 
intervene to similarly reduce conflicts of interests between financial advisors 
and retail investors.53 As is to be expected, the response of financial advisors 
to heightened standards of conduct varied according to their allegiances—
investment advisers strongly support leveling the playing field,54 while brokers 
oppose the imposition of fiduciary obligation.55 Yet, the approach of the DOL 
varies significantly from that of the SEC, with the former stridently 
emphasizing a near-complete elimination of conflicts of interests through the 
imposition of fiduciary obligations across the board;56 and the latter attempting 
to straddle the line between brokers and investment advisers, without imposing 
the fiduciary obligations of the latter on the former.57  
A. The DOL and the Fiduciary Rule 
The first meaningful effort to harmonize the legal framework applicable to 
brokers and investment advisers came from the DOL through its authority 
under ERISA. ERISA is a federal statute aimed at protecting employees that 
                                                                                                                     
 51 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203     § 913(f)–(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1827–29 (2010). 
 52 See Interview by Inv. Adviser Ass’n with Arthur Levitt, former Chairman, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, in Investment Advisers Act 75th Anniversary – Statements from Industry 




 53 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,580 (May 9, 2018) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 54 See Michael Joyce, The SEC’s Best Interest Rule Doesn’t Go Far Enough, WEALTH 
MGMT. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.wealthmanagement.com/regulation-compliance/sec-
s-best-interest-rule-doesn-t-go-far-enough [https://perma.cc/TXQ2-BGK9] (stating that 
“many registered investment advisors supported the implementation of the stricter 
Department of Labor fiduciary rule”). 
 55 See Tamar Frankel, The Brokers’ War Against Fiduciary Duties, VERDICT (Mar. 
14, 2018), https://verdict.justia.com/2018/03/14/brokers-war-fiduciary-duties 
[https://perma.cc/5ACB-2WPY] (“[B]rokers are fighting hard to avoid bearing fiduciary 
duties to their clients.”). 
 56 See, e.g., Definition of Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest—Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 
pts. 2509, 2510, 2550). 
 57 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,575. 
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participate in private retirement plans.58 The DOL is responsible for 
administering the statute, including promulgating regulations in accordance 
with the statute.59 Importantly, ERISA contains a provision that deems 
someone a fiduciary to a retirement plan if she “renders investment advice for 
a fee or other compensation . . . with respect to any moneys or other property 
of such plan.”60 In response to the (potential) ambiguity of whether incidental 
advice that brokers provide may transform them into fiduciaries, the DOL 
adopted regulations to identify when it deemed a financial advisor a 
fiduciary.61 Prior to adoption of the Fiduciary Rule, the DOL defined a 
financial advisor as a fiduciary if and to the extent she provided personalized 
investment advice on a regular basis based on a mutual agreement.62 This 
definition limited the designation of fiduciary to include investment advisers, 
who are already fiduciaries under the Advisers Act; and, importantly, to 
exclude brokers who only provide advice in relation to their sales.63 Thus, 
while investment advisers were deemed fiduciaries under ERISA, brokers 
were subject to the suitability standard when dealing with retirement 
investors.64 
Under ERISA, fiduciaries are subjected to significant constraints that, 
importantly, are designed to ensure the “undivided loyalty” of the fiduciary.65 
Indeed, the range of conflicting interest transactions ERISA prohibits is more 
                                                                                                                     
 58 See Judson MacLaury, A Brief History: The U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. DEP’T 
LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/dolhistoxford.htm 
[https://perma.cc/349F-QMHP] (“[ERISA] gave the Department a major role in protecting 
and improving the nation’s private retirement systems.”). 
 59 See Health Plans & Benefits, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans [https://perma.cc/YYU8-BJZL]. 
 60 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.     § 1002(21)(A) (2012). 
There are other activities that may make someone a fiduciary to a retirement plan, but this 
is the only one of significance for purposes of the Response. 
 61 See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20,946 (final regulation defining “who is a fiduciary of 
an employee benefit plan under [ERISA]”). 
 62 According to DOL regulation, a financial advisor is a fiduciary if she: (1) advises as 
to “the value of securities or other property, or make[s] recommendations as to the 
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property (2) on a 
regular basis (3) pursuant to a mutual agreement, arrangement, or understanding” between 
the advisor and an employee benefit plan, (4) that such services “will serve as a primary 
basis for investment decisions with respect to” the plan’s assets, and (5) that “the advice 
will be individualized based on the particular needs of the plan or IRA.” Definition of the 
Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 
at 20,954–55. 
 63 See id.; Investment Advisers Act of 1940     § 202, 15 U.S.C.     § 80b-6(3) (2012). 
 64 See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20,946. 
 65 See Krug, supra note 23, at 356. 
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extensive than securities laws and regulations.66 Nonetheless, because the 
original ERISA fiduciary definition only encompassed financial advisors who 
were already designated fiduciaries under securities laws (i.e., investment 
advisers) and because investment advisers receive asset-based compensation 
(as opposed to commission-based compensation), ERISA’s stringent fiduciary 
limitations did not significantly affect the ability of investment advisers to 
service retirement accounts.67  
This all changed in 2016 when the DOL adopted the Fiduciary Rule. The 
Fiduciary Rule expanded the scope of investment advice that would cause a 
financial advisor to be deemed a fiduciary under ERISA.68 Per the new 
definition, an advisor is a fiduciary if she provides “investment advice to a 
retirement investor if, among other things, in exchange for a fee or other 
compensation, she recommends particular securities, investment strategies, or 
portfolio allocations to the investor.”69 In eschewing an agreement or that the 
advice be provided regularly, the Fiduciary Rule effectively brought brokers 
into the fold as ERISA fiduciaries if they provided any advice to retirement 
investors. And importantly, under the Fiduciary Rule, as advisors of retirement 
accounts, brokers would be required to provide conflict-free advice and to put 
their clients’ needs above their self-interest.70 
The Fiduciary Rule represented a significant shift in how brokers would be 
allowed to interact with retirement investors. As newly-designated ERISA 
fiduciaries, brokers would be subject to the same constraints as investment 
advisers.71 Most notably, these restrictions included a prohibition on 
transaction-based compensation (such as commissions), unless the retirement 
advisor qualified for an exemption.72 Under one such exemption—the best 
interest contract exemption—retirement advisors could continue to receive 
commission-based compensation, but any difference in the amount of 
commission paid to the retirement advisor had to be based on neutral factors.73 
Thus, any commission received must be the same for similar product types, 
                                                                                                                     
 66 See id. at 353 (describing prohibited transactions under ERISA that are allowed 
under securities laws). 
 67 Id. at 341 (“By imposing on these advisers a stringent standard of conduct and 
prohibiting them from entering into certain types of transactions, the statute establishes the 
general framework for fiduciaries’ obligations to retirement investors.”). 
 68 See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20,997 (setting forth the DOL’s revised interpretation 
of “investment advice”). 
 69 Krug, supra note 23, at 360. 
 70 See Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002, 21,007 (Apr. 8, 2016) 
(establishing that Advisers must adhere to the standards of fiduciary conduct and “put the 
interests of Retirement Investors first”). 
 71 See Krug, supra note 23, at 359. 
 72 See Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. at 21,002. 
 73 See id. at 21,007 (explaining that the Best Interest Contract Exemption allows 
advisers to receive commission only if they adhere to procedures implemented to “prevent 
violations of the Impartial Conduct Standard”). 
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unless there was an objective, neutral basis for the difference, such as the time 
or analytical effort required to advise the retirement investor.74 The Fiduciary 
Rule, therefore, effectively eliminated many commission structures that 
allowed brokers to sell securities that were suitable, but possibly not in the best 
interest of the investor because of the brokers’ commission. 
The Fiduciary Rule was met with staunch opposition from its inception. It 
was finalized in April 2016 and, after numerous delays, full implementation 
was slated for July 1, 2019.75 However, before the Fiduciary Rule could come 
to be, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated it.76 The challenge to the 
Fiduciary Rule came from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”), and others that 
contested the legal basis on which the executive branch adopted the Rule.77 In 
March 2018, the Fifth Circuit held that the DOL’s definition of financial 
advice was unreasonably broad and exceeded the scope of the Department’s 
authority.78 The DOL failed to appeal the Fifth Circuit’s ruling to the Supreme 
Court and, consequently, the controversial Fiduciary Rule is dead.79 
Despite its ultimate demise, the Fiduciary Rule was an important step in 
the path towards harmonization and fiduciarization of investment advice. 
Many brokerage firms reported that, despite the repeal of the Fiduciary Rule, 
they intend to maintain the changes they made to compensation and fee 
                                                                                                                     
 74 See id. at 21,011 (“[T]he ongoing receipt of a Level Fee such as fixed percentage of 
the value of a customer’s assets under management, where such values are determined by 
readily available independent sources or independent valuations . . . .”). 
 75 See News Release: U.S. Department of Labor Extends Transition Period for 
Fiduciary Rule Exemptions, U.S. DEP’T LABOR (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20171127-0 [https://perma.cc/QR75-
CMER]. 
 76 See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 363 (5th 
Cir. 2018). 
 77 See U.S. Chamber Examines Potential Harmful Impact of Fiduciary Regulation on 
Investors, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.uschamber.com/press-
release/us-chamber-examines-potential-harmful-impact-fiduciary-regulation-investors 
[https://perma.cc/YAV3-ZZH5] (discussing the proposal of the Department of Labor to 
impose fiduciary duties on brokers); Best Interest Standard, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. 
ASS’N, https://www.sifma.org/explore-issues/best-interest-standard/ 
[https://perma.cc/R78W-ZFJ8] (“Together with the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce . . . SIFMA filed a legal challenge to the Department of Labor’s fiduciary 
standard of conduct rule for brokers and registered investment advisors . . . .”). 
 78 See Chamber of Commerce, 885 F.3d at 387–88 (“DOL found ‘in a long-extant 
statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the American economy.’ 
And, although lacking direct regulatory authority over IRA ‘fiduciaries,’ DOL 
impermissibly bootstrapped what should have been safe harbor criteria into ‘backdoor 
regulation.’”). 
 79 See Ross Snel, R.I.P., DOL Fiduciary Rule, BARRON’S (June 21, 2018), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/r-i-p-dol-fiduciary-rule-1529605320 
[https://perma.cc/75QD-HLZX]. 
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structures in anticipation of the Rule’s implementation.80 The Fiduciary Rule 
is a bell that cannot be unrung, as financial advisors are unlikely to revert to 
their pre-Fiduciary Rule business and compensation models.81 Further, the 
uproar over the Fiduciary Rule has resulted in greater investor awareness of 
the potential conflicts that may exist in their advisor relationships.82 Retail 
investors are now more likely to have greater expectations of their financial 
advisors.83 Importantly, the increased public discourse on the Fiduciary Rule 
has heightened its regulatory importance. And as a result, the SEC in 2018 
finally decided to exercise the authority granted to it under the Dodd-Frank 
Act to heighten the standard of conduct applicable to brokers. 
B. The SEC & Regulation Best Interest 
Under Section 913(f) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC is authorized to 
undertake rulemaking to address the “regulatory standards of care for brokers, 
dealers, investment advisers [and their associates] for providing personalized 
investment advice . . . to such retail customers.”84 The SEC is also authorized 
under section 913(g) to adopt a uniform fiduciary standard applicable to both 
brokers and investment advisers.85 In April 2018, the SEC put forward 
Regulation Best Interest (the “Regulation”), which is a package of proposed 
rulemakings and regulatory interpretations regarding the relationship between 
brokers and investment advisers, on the one hand, and retail investors on the 
other.86 Notably, in proposing the Regulation, the SEC exercised its 
rulemaking authority under section 913(f) to impose standards of conduct on 
                                                                                                                     
 80 See Charles Goldman, Eulogy for the DOL Fiduciary Rule, BARRON’S (Aug. 22, 
2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/eulogy-for-the-dol-fiduciary-rule-1534955248 
[https://perma.cc/BA63-NNKA] (explaining that “[m]any broker-dealers, probably most, 
changed processes and procedures for the better”). 
 81 See David Trainer, Even Without the Rule, Fiduciary Awareness Remains, FORBES 
(Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/03/16/even-without-
the-law-fiduciary-rule-awareness-remains/#f2174a5425af [https://perma.cc/EP3H-T4HP]. 
 82 See Jeff Benjamin, DOL Rule or Not, Be Prepared to Defend Investments, Fees 
Under a Fiduciary Standard, INVESTMENTNEWS (Feb. 1, 2017), 
www.investmentnews.com/article/ 2 017020 1/FREE/170209983/dol-rule-or-not-be-
prepared-to-defend-investments-fees-under-a [https://perma.cc/87JH-QV8R] (quoting Joe 
Taiber, managing partner of an investment consulting firm, who observed that “[r]egardless 
of what happens, the cat’s out of the bag now, because clients are more educated” and that 
“[w]hether the full rule is implemented or delayed, it doesn’t matter to the end user”). 
 83 See id. 
 84 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203     § 913(f), 124 Stat. 1376, 1827–29 (2010). Dodd-Frank also authorized the SEC to 
adopt a uniform fiduciary standard applicable to both brokers and investment advisers. In 
adopting Regulation Best Interest, however, the SEC did not exercise its authority under 
this provision. See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,675 (May 9, 2018) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 85 See Dodd-Frank Act     § 913(g). 
 86 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,574. 
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brokers, rather than uniform fiduciary obligations for brokers and investment 
advisers per section 913(g).87 
The proposed Regulation requires brokers to act in the “best interest” of 
retail investors and prohibits brokers from placing their own financial interests 
ahead of their clients’ interests.88 Notably, the Regulation does not go as far as 
the Fiduciary Rule with respect to banning commission-based compensation.89 
Recognizing that commissions constitute the most prevalent form of broker 
compensation, the SEC determined that prohibiting commissions would be 
more harmful than beneficial for retail investors.90 However, the Commission 
also noted that the commission-based model is innately conflicted, and the 
current suitability standard may not sufficiently protect retail investors.91 
Thus, the Regulation aims to strike a balance between maintaining 
commissions as a viable compensation model for brokers while improving 
retail investor protection. 
To address the embedded conflicts that accompany commission-based 
compensation plans and enhance retail investor protection, the Regulation 
imposes additional requirements on brokers in their interactions with retail 
clients.92 Although the Regulation fails to define “best interest,” it states that 
the determination as to whether a broker acted in the best interest of her client 
will be made based on the facts and circumstances at the time the investment 
advice is provided.93 In place of a definition, the Regulation provides a three-
                                                                                                                     
 87 See id. at 21,575 (“[W]e are proposing a new rule . . . [t]hat all broker-
dealers . . . act in the best interest of the retail customer at the time the recommendation is 
made without placing the financial or other interest of the broker-dealer . . . ahead of the 
interest of the retail customer (‘Regulation Best Interest’).”) (emphasis added). 
 88 See id. 
 89 See Sarah O’Brien, Labor Department Won’t Enforce Investor Protection Rule 
After Court Decision, CNBC (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/19/dol-
shelving-enforcement-of-fiduciary-rule-after-court-decision.html [https://perma.cc/9LDE-
RHNT] (“[The fiduciary rule] requires advisors and brokers to put their clients’ interests 
before their own when advising on retirement accounts such as 401(k) plans and individual 
retirement accounts.”). 
 90 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,580–81 (“[B]roker-dealers that 
would be considered to be a ‘fiduciary’ under the DOL Fiduciary Rule . . . would be 
prohibited from receiving common forms of broker-dealer compensation (notably, 
transaction-based compensation), which would effectively eliminate a broker-dealer’s 
ability or willingness to provide investment advice with respect to investors’ retirement 
assets.”). 
 91 See id. at 21,575 (“Like many principal-agent relationships, the relationship 
between a broker-dealer and an investor has inherent conflicts of interest, which may 
provide an incentive to a broker-dealer to seek to maximize its compensation at the 
expense of the investor it is advising.”). 
 92 See id. 
 93 See id. at 21,587 (explaining that the regulation does not intend to define “best 
interest” since the recommendation depends on the “facts and circumstances of the 
particular recommendation and the particular retail customer”). 
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part framework that serves as a guide for brokers to know if they have acted in 
their client’s best interest.94 
To qualify for the Regulation’s safe harbor, first, a broker must provide 
written disclosure of the material terms of the broker-client relationship, 
including fees and any material conflicts of interests connected to the broker’s 
investment advice.95 The broker is obligated to make these disclosures when 
the investor opens the account, periodically as needed to update prior 
disclosures, and at the time of sale if there are material conflicts related to the 
security being sold.96 
Second, the broker must exercise reasonable prudence and care to 
determine whether the security is in the best interest of the customer.97 Thus, 
the broker may no longer merely consider whether the investment is suitable 
for the client; instead, she must determine if it is in the client’s best interest, 
thereby raising the broker’s obligations.98 To comply with this requirement, a 
broker is not required to evaluate all potential investments; but her 
investigation must be sufficiently broad to constitute reasonable diligence.99 
Further, the broker must also obtain client-specific information regarding the 
investor’s risk appetite, investment goals, financial circumstances, and other 
relevant information.100 Notably, the standard of care required cannot be 
waived by the client, nor can the broker cure any failure to meet this obligation 
through disclosure.101 
                                                                                                                     
 94 See id. at 21,681. 
 95 See id. at 21,681 (“[The broker-dealer must], prior to or at the time of such 
recommendation, reasonably disclose in writing all material conflicts of interest associated 
with the recommendation.”). 
 96 See 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,605 (establishing that disclosure “may be achieved through a 
variety of approaches: (1) at the beginning of a relationship . . . ; (2) on a regular or 
periodic basis . . . ; (3) at other points . . . ; and/or (4) at multiple points in the relationship 
or through a layered approach to disclosure”). 
 97 See id. at 21,589 (“[T]he BIC Exemption’s best interest standard incorporates 
‘objective standards of care and undivided loyalty’ that would require adherence to a 
professional standard of care in making investment recommendations that are in the 
investor’s best interest . . . .”). 
 98 This obligation closely tracks FINRA’s existing suitability standard found in 
FINRA Rule 2111. See Hillel T. Cohn et al., SEC Proposes a New Standard of Care for 
Broker-Dealers: Regulation Best Interest, MORRISON FOERSTER (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/180424-sec-regulation-best-interest.html 
[https://perma.cc/33M7-SEX5]. 
 99 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,609 (“Under the Care 
Obligation . . . [it] would not require a broker-dealer to analyze all possible securities, all 
other products, or all investment strategies to recommend the single ‘best’ security or 
investment strategy for the retail customer . . . .”). 
 100 See id. at 21,611 (listing elements that brokers have to consider regarding the 
client’s characteristics and circumstances). 
 101 See id. at 21,595 (“[A] broker-dealer would not be able to waive compliance with 
the rule’s obligation to act in the best interest of the retail customer at the time a 
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Third, the Regulation requires brokers to implement policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to identify conflicts of interest and to disclose 
material conflicts to retail investors in a timely manner.102 The policies and 
procedures must be capable of capturing new conflicts as they arise and must 
address how brokers will mitigate against compensation-based conflicts.103 Per 
the Regulation, disclosure will be insufficient with respect to certain conflicts 
such as those arising from sales incentives. In these instances, brokers will be 
required to eliminate the source of the conflict.104 Thus, despite choosing not 
to prohibit commission-based compensation, the Regulation places the burden 
on brokers to evaluate and, in some instances, minimize or eliminate conflicts 
of interest. 
The Regulation also requires brokers and investment advisers to provide 
retail investors with a “client relationship summary,” Form CRS.105 The 
summary would include information regarding: (i) the relationships, accounts, 
and services the firm offers; (ii) the standard of conduct applicable to offered 
services; (iii) the fees for and costs of services; (iv) comparisons between 
brokers and investment advisers services, fees, and standard of conduct; (v) 
conflicts of interests related to the broker’s services; (vi) access to additional 
information, such as legal or disciplinary actions against the brokerage firm 
and its brokers; and (vii) required questions a retail investor may want to 
ask.106 
With Regulation Best Interest, the SEC signaled its willingness to enter 
the ongoing conversation regarding the standard of conduct applicable to 
investment advisers and brokers. However, in formulating a new standard, it is 
questionable whether the Commission has truly moved the ball forward. On 
                                                                                                                     
recommendation is made and the specific obligations thereunder, nor can a retail customer 
agree to waive her protection under Regulation Best Interest.”). 
 102 See id. at 21,617 (explaining that the Conflict of Interest Obligations require a 
broker-dealer to disclose to the client all material conflict of interest related to the 
recommendation). 
 103 See id. 
 104 See Cohn et al., supra note 98 (“Disclosure alone will not suffice in the case of 
conflicts that relate to financial incentives or the manner in which associated persons are 
compensated.”); see also Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,619 (“A broker-
dealer seeking to address its Conflict of Interest Obligations through elimination of a 
material conflict of interest could choose to eliminate the conflict of interest entirely, for 
example by removing incentives associated with a particular product . . . .”). 
 105 See Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, What’s in a Name? 
Regulation Best Interest v. Fiduciary, Remarks at the National Association of Plan 
Advisors D.C. Fly-In Forum (July 24, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-
peirce-072418 [https://perma.cc/8XZ9-YG78] (“New Form CRS . . . is a four-page (at 
most) document to be delivered in addition to—not in place of—any of the current 
disclosure documents that broker-dealers and advisers currently provide.”). 
 106 See Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV; Required 
Disclosures in Retail Communications and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Names or 
Titles, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,416, 21,536 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 240, 249, 275, 279). 
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the one hand, the best interest standard and the accompanying disclosures are 
enhancements over the current suitability standard. However, on the other 
hand, by failing to harmonize the obligations of standard of conduct applicable 
to investment advisers and brokers, the SEC may have missed an opportunity 
to truly eliminate the confusion retail investors face in their dealings with 
financial service professionals. In Part IV, this Response briefly explores the 
implications of the failed Fiduciary Rule and the proposed Regulation Best 
Interest for retail investors. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR RETAIL INVESTORS 
As Professor Edwards details in his paper, conflicted advice is a 
significant problem for retail investors and the wider economy.107 Regulation 
Best Interest and the Fiduciary Rule sought to address the conflicted advice 
problem Professor Edwards discusses,108 albeit in different ways. However, 
both proposals fall short in addressing the problem of conflicted advice and the 
attendant consequences of such advice. Although the Fiduciary Rule has been 
vacated and ultimately will not be part of the regulatory landscape, it is useful 
to consider how it could have altered the relationship between retail investors 
and financial advisors, particularly in comparison to Regulation Best Interest. 
Part IV examines whether and to what extent the Fiduciary Rule and 
Regulation Best Interest effectively (i) address the problem of conflicted 
advice, (ii) reduce investor confusion, and (iii) increase investor protection. 
A. Conflicted Advice 
In light of the issues that stem from conflicted advice, it is important to 
consider whether and to what extent both the Fiduciary Rule and Regulation 
Best Interest address the issue of conflicted advice. 
The approach of the Fiduciary Rule to the problem of conflicted 
investment advice was, more or less, straightforward—retirement investment 
advisors, as fiduciaries, were required to avoid all conflicts of interest.109 This 
requirement would have implemented a near-complete ban on commission-
based compensation, unless an exception was available. The Fiduciary Rule, 
therefore, would have established a bright-line stance towards conflicted 
advice—it simply would not have been allowed.110 On the positive side, the 
bright-line the Fiduciary Rule created would have left very little room for 
conflicted advice to exist. Brokers would have been charged with putting the 
interests of their clients first, which could not be accomplished with many 
                                                                                                                     
 107 See Edwards, supra note 1, at 183. 
 108 See generally Peirce, supra note 105 (discussing the theoretical underpinnings of 
each proposed regulation). 
 109 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 110 It is more accurate to say a somewhat bright-line rule, given the exceptions 
possible. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
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commission-based compensation schemes.111 The hard stance of the Fiduciary 
Rule, therefore, would eliminate the problem of conflicted advice entirely, 
freeing retirement investors from the concerns that their brokers may be 
steering them towards puzzling product choices, which may not be in the 
investors’ best interests but would compensate the brokers handsomely. 
Despite these benefits, to some commentators the elimination of commission-
based products would not have resulted in a net benefit to retail investors.112 
Specifically, the Fiduciary Rule would have limited the investment products 
available to retirement investors and, possibly, forced some retirement 
investors with less assets out of the marketplace for retirement investment 
advice.113 
The SEC’s proposed approach to conflicted advice may be viewed as more 
of a middle-ground. Regulation Best Interest does not ban conflicted 
compensation schemes, such as commissions, but it requires brokers to take 
more active steps in mitigating and, in some cases, eliminating conflicts of 
interest.114 By requiring that brokers comply with the three-part framework to 
be entitled to the presumption that they acted in the best interests of their 
clients, Regulation Best Interest imposes a standard of conduct that exceeds 
the existing suitability standard.115 The Regulation permits transaction-based 
compensation plans, which are innately conflicted, but imposes a regime in 
which conflicts are disclosed and managed.116 The proposed framework, 
therefore, seeks to balance the interest of brokers to maintain commissions as a 
viable compensation method against the need to protect investors from the ills 
of conflicted advice. The question then becomes whether the proposed 
framework minimizes the effects of conflicted advice. 
In avoiding a prescriptive, bright-line standard, akin to the Fiduciary Rule, 
the SEC grants brokers some flexibility in designing compliance standards and 
                                                                                                                     
 111 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,620 (May 9, 2018) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (“[B]roker-dealer financial incentives—including internal 
compensation structures and compensation arrangements with third parties—create 
inherent conflicts that . . . may be difficult, if not impossible, to effectively manage through 
disclosure alone, or to eliminate.”). 
 112 See Paul R. Walsh & David W. Johns, Can the Retail Investor Survive the 
Fiduciary Standard?, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 437, 446–47 (2013) (explaining that if the 
commission-based products are eliminated, brokers would have to be compensated through 
a percentage fee. Therefore, brokers would require investors to have a minimum amount of 
assets and this would harm small investors who would not be able to afford a broker of 
investment advisor). 
 113 See Chamber of Commerce of United States v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 885 
F.3d 360, 368 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 114 See Cohn et al., supra note 98 (“Rather than prohibit all such conflicts, however, 
the SEC is proposing more rigorous requirements to manage and disclose conflicts of 
interest, including conflicts that arise from the manner in which a broker-dealer is 
compensated.”). 
 115 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 116 See supra Part III.B. 
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procedures that are suitable for their business and clients. The Regulation 
allows brokers to continue acting as principals for their own accounts in their 
dealings with retail investors but prohibits brokers from placing their interests 
before their clients’.117 Thus, brokers may continue to receive commission-
based compensation, provided that it is nonetheless in their clients’ best 
interests. Yet, it is questionable whether this fluid standard meaningfully 
mitigates against the conflicted advice problem. Setting aside the lack of 
definition of “best interest” (addressed in greater detail below), the Regulation 
falls short of establishing a fiduciary standard, which leaves retail investors 
exposed to significant conflicts of interest. The Regulation’s proposed three-
part framework establishes a way for brokers to earn a safe harbor but, 
arguably, does not do enough to protect retail investors from receiving 
conflicted advice. By providing brokers with a “check-the-box” mechanism to 
comply with their obligations to act in the client’s “best interest,” the 
Regulation fails to impose enough of a burden on brokers to reduce their 
conflicts of interest.  
Furthermore, in dealing with clients, brokers are not required to provide 
full and fair disclosure of all material conflicts; rather, they are obliged to 
provide reasonable disclosures.118 The standard of reasonableness, while 
appropriate for some situations, may not be the best standard when trying to 
mitigate against conflicts of interest.119 Regulation Best Interest, therefore, 
may have moved the needle somewhat on the issue of conflicted advice, but it 
may not be enough to provide meaningful investor protection. Indeed, it is 
questionable whether a disclosure-based regulatory framework will effectively 
address the problem of conflicted advice.120 This is true particularly in the face 
of the unequal power dynamic between brokers and their clients and the 
unavoidable conflicts of interest that accompany transaction-based 
compensation.121 
                                                                                                                     
 117 See Cohn et al., supra note 98 (“Under the proposed regulation, broker-dealers and 
their associated persons would be required to act in the ‘best interest’ of their retail clients 
and would be prohibited from placing their interests ahead of such clients. Broker-dealers 
could continue to act in a principal capacity in relation to their customers . . . .”). 
 118 See Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Proposals 
Relating to Regulation Best Interest, Form CRS, Restrictions on the Use of Certain Names 
or Titles, and Commission Interpretation Regarding the Standard of Conduct for 
Investment Advisers (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/stein-
statement-open-meeting-041818 [https://perma.cc/Z7F6-ZEG2]. 
 119 See id. (discussing the “safe harbor” implied by the best interest obligation, and 
stating that the SEC could have proposed a more effective standard to mitigate conflict of 
interest in the broker-dealer and client relationship). 
 120 See supra Part III.C. 
 121 See Cohn et al., supra note 98 (describing how conflicts are inherent in the broker-
dealer business model). 
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B. Investor Confusion 
Another implication of the Fiduciary Rule and Regulation Best Interest is 
their effect on minimizing investor confusion. To the extent investors are less 
confused about from whom they receive advice, it is possible investors may be 
better able to guard themselves against the negative impact of conflicted 
advice. That is to say, if an investor knows that the advice she receives is 
conflicted or potentially conflicted, she may be warier of accepting or 
following the advice.  
The Fiduciary Rule would have harmonized the standard of conduct 
applicable to brokers and investment advisers—all retirement investment 
advisors, regardless of classification, would have been fiduciaries of their 
clients.122 However, owing to the DOL’s limited authority, the Rule’s 
harmony would have only extended to retirement investment accounts.123 
Thus, on the one hand, the Fiduciary Rule would have reduced the potential 
for investor confusion by imposing a uniform fiduciary standard on retirement 
investment advisors. But, on the other hand, the Fiduciary Rule would have 
exacerbated potential investor confusion, because the applicable standards of 
conduct would vary based on whether the investor received advice from a 
broker versus an investment adviser and whether the advice was regarding a 
retirement or non-retirement account. The Fiduciary Rule, therefore, would 
have created both more clarity and more confusion regarding the level of 
protection to which retirement investors would be entitled. An investor would 
receive the same level of protection for retirement-related advice, without 
regard for whether the advice came from a broker or an investment adviser. 
However, for non-retirement advice, she would remain subject to the 
confusing legal delineation between brokers and investment advisers.  
Yet, it is important to note that most investors are likely to seek 
investment advice, for both retirement and non-retirement accounts, from a 
single financial advisor. Thus, in order to comply with the Fiduciary Rule, 
most financial advisors would be forced to raise their standards all-around 
regardless of the type of account a retail client may have. Meaning, rather than 
try to comply with conflicting standards, brokers likely would have self-
imposed the Fiduciary Rule’s higher standards even when advising non-
retirement accounts. In sum, despite being a half-measure, the Fiduciary Rule 
took a meaningful step towards minimizing the existing conflicts of interest 
within the DOL’s sphere of authority (i.e., the retirement investor-financial 
advisor relationship), which likely would have permeated investor advice 
beyond the scope of ERISA. 
In proposing the Regulation, the SEC asserts that it seeks to minimize the 
gap that exists in how much protection investors believe they have when 
                                                                                                                     
 122 See Krug, supra note 23, at 359 (explaining that the Fiduciary Rule treats brokers 
like other ERISA fiduciaries). 
 123 See supra Part III.A. 
2019 THE CONFLICTED ADVICE PROBLEM 21 
receiving advice and how much protection they actually have.124 However, in 
addressing the disparity, the SEC eschews the well-known fiduciary standard 
for the unknown, newly created “best interest” standard.125 The Regulation 
and its new standard create or exacerbate three sources of potential investor 
confusion.  
First, the Regulation fails to harmonize the standard of conduct applicable 
to investment advisers and brokers who provide investment advice.126 Despite 
acting in a substantially similar role as investment advisers, Regulation Best 
Interest does not impose on brokers who give investment advice the same 
fiduciary obligations as investment advisers.127 This only serves to exacerbate 
the existing confusion regarding the level of protection that is available to 
retail investors in the marketplace.  
Second, “best interest” is undefined in the Regulation.128 With the best 
interest standard, retail investors are not much better off in understanding what 
duties a broker may owe them and, likely, the broker’s obligations are still less 
in reality than investors expect, since the broker is not a fiduciary.129  
Third, the name of the standard suggests that brokers are free from 
conflicts. To a layperson, saying that someone must act in your best interest 
implies that (i) the person is your agent (to use a legal phrase) and that (ii) 
your interests must supersede hers. But neither of these things is true under 
Regulation Best Interest.130 Thus, the very name of the standard deepens 
investor confusion, by misleading retail investors as to the legal obligations of 
their brokers in providing investment advice.  
In sum, despite claiming to want to minimize investor confusion, it is 
questionable whether Regulation Best Interest actually does this. In creating a 
new standard of conduct, the SEC has exacerbated the problem of investor 
confusion without truly closing the gap between investor expectation and the 
reality of investor protection. And, indeed, because of its misleading name, 
Regulation Best Interest may have worsened investor confusion. 
                                                                                                                     
 124 See SEC Proposes to Enhance Protections and Preserve Choice for Retail Investors 
in Their Relationships with Investment Professionals, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 
18, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-68 [https://perma.cc/DHQ6-
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 125 See supra Part III.B. 
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 127 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 128 See Stein, supra note 118 (“Despite repeated requests to define what best interest 
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 129 See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 130 See supra Part III.B. 
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C. Investor Protection 
Both the Fiduciary Rule and Regulation Best Interest directly implicate 
investor protection. The pertinent question one must ask is whether the 
proposed changes provide investors with greater protection either (i) against 
conflicted advice, or (ii) against the possible negative consequences of self-
interested investment advice. 
The Fiduciary Rule transformed all retirement investment advisors into 
fiduciaries of their clients.131 Under the Fiduciary Rule, brokers would owe 
their retirement clients their undivided loyalty, which meant commission-
based compensation was prohibited.132 Undoubtedly, the Fiduciary Rule 
would have increased the protection available to retirement investors by 
imposing fiduciary obligations on brokers, thereby ensuring a basic level of 
protection for all retirement investors regardless of whether they receive 
investment advice from a broker versus an investment adviser. However, as 
stated prior, this greater level of protection would have been limited to brokers 
who provided retirement investment advice,133 thus limiting the effectiveness 
of the Fiduciary Rule. Thus, the Fiduciary Rule would have provided investors 
with protection against both conflicted advice and the costs of self-interested 
advice; however, owing to the limited scope of ERISA this protection would 
not have been market-wide.  
A primary goal of Regulation Best Interest is to raise the standard of 
conduct applicable to brokers;134 and the best interest standard does, indeed, 
impose a standard of conduct higher than the current suitability rule.135 
Brokers are no longer allowed to steer clients towards a high-commission 
product when a substantially similar product that pays a lower commission is 
also available.136 Thus, a broker’s self-interest cannot be the predominant 
motivating factor in her advice to retail investors.137 Further, in requiring 
brokers to mitigate or eliminate particularly egregious conflicts of interest,138 
Regulation Best Interest reduces the potential for conflicted advice. It places 
an affirmative duty on brokers to assess existing conflicts and to take steps 
necessary to minimize the impact of these conflicts on their client 
                                                                                                                     
 131 See O’Brien, supra note 89. 
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relationships.139 Lastly, Form CRS provides investors with more information 
about who they are transacting with (i.e., whether their financial services 
professional is a broker or an investment adviser), the applicable fees for the 
services they are receiving, and past disciplinary information on the broker 
and/or her associated firm.140 More information for retail investors about the 
persons to whom they have entrusted their investment is certainly a welcomed 
change and may empower investors to be more critical of their brokers’ 
investment advice. 
However, despite these positive attributes, there are legitimate concerns as 
to whether Regulation Best Interest is a meaningful improvement on the status 
quo. First, it is questionable whether and to what extent the best interest 
standard is more protective of investors than the suitability standard. The best 
interest standard does not rise to the level of fiduciary duties, but it is supposed 
to be more than the suitability standard. Yet, the best interest standard is 
modeled so closely on the suitability standard, with the wording of the former 
tracking the wording of the latter to a significant degree.141 Thus, it is unclear 
just how the best interest standard differs from the suitability standard.142 As 
the proposed Regulation is revised and eventually adopted, it remains to be 
seen what additional measure of protection the best interest standard provides 
that supersedes the existing standard.  
Second, Regulation Best Interest relies heavily on disclosure to protect 
retail investors. Disclosure is only as good as it is effective and many, 
including some SEC Commissioners, have raised concerns about whether the 
disclosure-heavy standard of conduct will have any meaningful effect on retail 
investors.143 As studies have shown, investors are not likely to read and/or 
understand disclosures that are given to them.144 Given the importance of 
disclosure in the implementation of the best interest standard, the SEC ought 
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to ensure that the disclosures are as effective as possible in conveying the 
necessary information to investors. But, even the most effective disclosures 
may not be enough to protect investors without a more robust investor 
protection regime. Thus, reasonable minds may differ on whether the proposed 
framework of Regulation Best Interest enhances investor protection in any 
meaningful way. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The conflicted advice problem that faces retail investors seeking advice 
from brokers is persistent; it poses significant challenges for investors and 
regulators alike. Conflicted investment advice cost investors millions of 
dollars and has resulted in significant capital diversions within the larger 
economy. Recent efforts to solve this problem, however, have been plagued 
with shortcomings. The Fiduciary Rule was a bright line rule that threatened 
the viability of commission-based compensation for retail investment advice. 
It removed conflicts almost entirely from the broker-investor relationship. But 
in doing so, it arguably would have curtailed investor choice and possibly 
would have increased investor costs. With Regulation Best Interest, the SEC 
aimed to strike a middle ground. However, its attempts demonstrate the 
difficulties in balancing investor protection against industry interests. As a 
proposal, Regulation Best Interest is a step in the right direction, but it is 
insufficient. In spite of the Regulation, retail investors will nonetheless face 
significant conflicts of interest, confusion about the protections they are 
afforded in the market, and less actual protection than the fiduciary standard. 
To effectively address the conflicted advice problem, therefore, the SEC must 
decide which it values more: protecting investors protection or maintaining the 
viability of commission-based compensation. It is only in truly deciding 
between these two competing interests that Regulation Best Interest (or any 
future attempts to heighten the brokers’ standard of conduct) will be able to 
clarify the relationship between retail investors and their financial advisors. 
 
